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Aristotle on Good and Bad Actualities
said in respect to potentiality is such that the
same thing is potentially contraries. For
example, that which is said to be potentially
healthy is the same as that which is said to
be potentially ill, and these potentialities
occur together. For the potentiality for being
healthy is the same as that for being ill, and
likewise for the potentialities of being at rest
and changing, for building a house and
demolishing it, and for being built up to be
a house and for falling down. So the
potentiality for the one contrary occurs
together with the potentiality for the other
('to 1-iEV ouv 86vacr8at 'tavav'tta Ci11a
07t<ip:x,Et). But the contraries, such as being
healthy and being ill, cannot occur together.
It follows that necessarily one or the other of
these is the good, but both potentialities have
the same status as good, or neither does
(cOO''t' av<iyKT] 'tOD'tffiV 8<i'tEpov d vat
'taya8ov, 'tO BE 86vacr8at 611oiroc;
a11$6'tEpov il o08€'tEpov). It follows that
the actuality is better. But among bad
things, the end and the actuality must be
worse than the potentiality, for the same
thing is potentially both contraries.
It is therefore clear that there is no
badness apart from things. For the bad is by
its nature posterior to the potentiality. 1
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This paper is a discussion of one of the more
neglected passages in the central books of Aristotle's
Metaphysics E> 9 1051 a4-19 . In this passage Aristotle
makes some assertions concerning relations that hold among
potentialities and actualities, both good and bad. The~e
assertions seem to be made as an afterthought, and theu
relation to the analysis of potentiality and actuality that
precedes is unclear. I shall argue that i~ this pass~ge
Aristotle is in effect providing a metaphysical foundatiOn
for the normative component of a teleological analysis of
composite substance.
I consider certain difficulties in reconciling the text
with the account of potentiality and actuality presented
earlier in Metaphysics e. I then briefly explore some of the
implications that this passage has for our understanding of
Aristotelian teleology.
I
In Metaphysics E> 9, 1051a4-19, Aristotle writes:

It is clear from the following considerations
that the actuality is better and more valuable
(Kat ~EA:tirov Kat 'tl.!ltffi'tE pa) than t~e
good (cr1touoa{ ac;) potentiality. Whatever IS
1
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Here and elsewhere, all translations from the Greek
are my own.
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Aristotle begins by asserting his conclusion:
a good potentiality is not as good as the actuality to which
it is correlated. In what sense is a potentiality good? Is
Aristotle talking about a potentiality for a good? Or is he
talking about an ability or disposition that is good insofar
as it is especially conducive to its correlative actuality? As
often happens, the conclusion for which Aristotle is arguing
becomes clear only by tracing the course of the argument.
II
This argument begins with the assertion that whenever a potentiality for some X inheres in a subject, the
potentiality for the contrary of X likewise inheres in that
subject. Aristotle presents the example of a living body.
By virtue of being a living body, it has both the potentiality
for good health and the potentiality for bad health. On
what basis is Aristotle able to say that all potentialities are
similarly correlated to contraries? Aristotle's reasons are
presented in the previous chapter, e 8, in which he argues
that actuality is prior to potentiality on the grounds that the
necessary eternal motions, on which all other motions
depend, involve no potentiality. 2 This is so, he says,
because "everything which is potentially admits of not being
in actuality" (to 8uva-rov M 1tdv £v8€x.E-rat ~-til
tvEpyEiv); accordingly, potential beings are perishable
(1 050b 10-11 ). Here 8uva-r6v does not have the sense of
the logically possible, that which is not impossible. Rather,
it denotes a metaphysical principle of change, absent in
respect to those features of a thing that do not change. Any
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substrate_ of this sort of 8uva~-tt<; for some x will be such as
can be either x or not x.3 The contrary to any x will be
the absence of x, within that substrate that admits of x. For
the presence and absence of some characteristic are "those
that are the most opposed to each other, of those that are in
the_ s~e receptive ~ubject" (Metaph. ~ 10 1018a28-29).
This Is why any subject that has the potentiality for X will
also have the potentiality for the contrary of X.
So ev~n though potentialities for contrary attributes
cannot be Simultaneously actualized, they nevertheless
accompan~ each other within the same subject. This is not
problematical, a~ f~ as it goes. But in 0 9 Aristotle goes
on to say t~at this IS why there is the same potentiality for
~he contr~Ies. The basis on which Aristotle makes this
mference. IS not clear. The statement is doubly puzzling
because It seems to contradict points made earlier in
Metaphysics e.
. ~t . e 2 1046b4-24 Aristotle contrasts rational
potent~al~t~es (those that are ~-tE-ra A.oyou) and nonrational
potent_tah~Ies, on th~ g~ounds that while a potentiality of the
first kmd_ Is ~potentiality for contraries, a potentiality of the
second kmd Is correlative to only one actuality. While the
hot has a potentiality to heat but not to chill and the cold
has a potentiality to chill but not to heat, o~e with an art
has ~he potentiality to produce both the product of that art
and Its contrary. This point, familiar from Plato's Republic

3

2

The reliance on this earlier argument is an indication
that the argument of e 9 is not an unrelated observation
simply tacked onto Metaph. e, as may first appear.
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See also Cat. 10 13a17-20: "When that which admits
of contraries is present, it is possible for each contrary to
change i~to the other, unless the one contrary belongs to
some subject by nature, as hot belongs to fire."
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(I 333E-334B) 4 is explained by th~ fact that one with an art
has an account by virtue of which one understands the
cause of the coming-to-be of the product of that art. One
would be in a position to ensure that the prod~ct of t?at art
would be absent through the purposeful withholdmg or
removal of the cause of that product. Because not ev~ry
subject is such as can accept the product of t~at art, bemg
deficient in respect to the product of that art IS .a ~ontrary,
not a contradictory, to having that product. This IS .why a
rational potentiality such as an art is correlative to

contraries.
.
Hence rational potentialities stand m c~ntrast to
nonrational potentialities, each of which is correlative to one
and only one effect. Aristotle elsewhere makes cle~ that
if a nonrational potentiality is brought tog~th~r .with an
object on which it can produce its effect, It IS JUSt that
effect, not its opposite, that will be produced.(Metaph. ~ 5
1048a6-7). But if an artisan and that on which. the artisan
can work are brought together, it is not nece ssarily.the c~se
5
that the product of the art will come about. A thud thing
. requue
. d , which Aristotle at e 5 1048a1 0-11
calls the
IS
.
.
authority (to KUptOv), identified as the desue or c?~Ice
(opE~tc; i\ 7tpoaipEcrtc;) of the artisan, which ~etermmes
whether or not the means for the artistic productiOn would

4 Cf.

Meno 87E-88D and Ion 531D-532B.

sAt Metaph . 8 8 1050b30-34, as ~~1~, Aristot~~
contrasts nonrational and rational potenttahtles on. th
1
basis . He indicates that the only respec~ in which a ~mg .e
nonrational potentiality will be correlative to opposites .ts
insofar as its presence and absence would lead to oppostte
results.

Aristotle on Good and Bad Actualities

131

be present. In the case of Aristotle's example, a physician
will be the one who knows what human health is, and, as
long as the patient is curable, can provide the conditions for
the actualization of health. But by virtue of that same
knowledge, the physician knows how to withhold these
conditions, and assure that health is not actualized. Instead
disease would be actualized. For on the Aristotelian
understanding, disease is not an actuality unto itself, as it
sometimes is for us, when it is the flourishing of a certain
microbe. Rather, it is the body's state when its potentiality
for health is not actualized (Metaph. H 5 1044b29-346).

6

Aristotle' s account in H 5 is actually a bit more
complicated than this . The body is said to be related to
health and disease as is water to wine and vinegar; in each
case the latter two terms are the contraries to which the
first term is related as matter. In each case "It is the
matter of the one in respect to disposition (€~tc;) and form ,
and it is the matter of the other in respect to privation and
perishing contrary to nature" (1044b32-34) . Thus, the
body without the form of health is diseased. To preserve
the analogy, it should follow that any water without the
form of wine is vinegar. This of course is not so .
Aristotle posited water as an element, with its own nature ,
and vinegar as a compound (J..Li~tc;) of water and earth, in
which there is a preponderance of water (Mete. IV 7
384a3-16, 10 389a7-ll). The continuation of the passage
is even more puzzling. It is a corpse which is said to be
related to the body as is vinegar to water. Aristotle seems
to be saying that a body, as such, is alive, for it is the
corpse (not the body) which is said to be the matter of the
living body . Aristotle apparently gives health and life
equal status as being a positive state . Likewise disease .and
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Returning to e 9, we see that one of Aristotle's
examples of a single potentiality that is a potentiality for
contraries is indeed an instance of a rational potentiality: the
potentiality that allows one to build a house is that which
allows one to demolish a house. (This is explained by the
fact that one must know the cause of the internal coherence
and stability of a house in order to build one. With such a

being a corpse have here an equal status as privation. The
thought seems to be that disease is partial death, through
(partial) absence of form, allowing the organized body to
fall back into a mass of unorganized chemical constituents.
The identification of the body and the living body rests on
the thesis, prominent in Metaph. H, that matter and the
form that it admits constitute a unity in such a way that the
matter, as such, is not what it is apart from this form. On
this account, the matter that pre-exists the composite
substance no longer exists, except "potentially." (Some
have taken this teaching to play a key role in the resolution
of the puzzles of Metaphysics Z and H. See, for example,
M. L. Gill, Aristotle on Substance: the Paradox of Unity
[Princeton, 1989].) Leaving this issue aside, it is clear that
the analogy with water, wine, and vinegar is forced in
another respect. Though the water of the wine is not an
independent constituent in the wine, there can be water as
such that is not wine. But even if we disregard the
difficulties involved with the vinegar example, because
Aristotle is not always consistent on the question of the
pre-existence and survival of matter as such, this passage
alone does not tell against the thesis that within Metaph.
8, the contrary to an actualized form is simply the
privation of that form within the matter that accepts the
form .
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knowledge its coherence and stability can be easily
removed.) But how are the other examples to be accounted
for?
We n?t~ th~t when Aristotle states the principle that
every potentiality Is the principle of only one change, he
concentrates on those principles that he takes to be
pot~ntialities in the strict sense of the term: principles of
~otlon or ~h~ge in something else or in a thing itself
msofar as It IS something else. These are the active
po~entialities, such as heat, cold, or the soul. In e 1
Aris~otle distinguishes these from passive potentialities. A
passive potentiality is that feature of a substrate that is the
princip!e of its being acted upon and changed, were it to
come mto requisite contact with the correlative active
potentiality (0 1 1046all-13). These are said to be
potentialities in a secondary sense, for they are both
conceptually and ontologically derivative from active
potentiali~ies (1046a1_5-_I?). We note that e 9's examples
of no~_at10nal pote~tlalitles that are correlative to contrary
actualities are passive potentialities. This is clear in the
case of the potentiality for being built up and for being
knocke~ down. Less clear are the cases of the potentialities
for mot10n and rest, and for health and disease. For motion
can be a natural process, of which the source is within the
subject, as can progress towards health. On the other hand
both cases can be passive processes, as in the cases of bein~
healed through surgery and what Aristotle calls "violent"
motion. And even in those cases in which the motions are
natural, Aristotle makes an ontological distinction between
the active and passive aspects of the substance undergoing
natural change (Physics VIII 4 254b7-33).
We have seen that in e 2 and 5 Aristotle makes
explicit why a single rational potentiality is correlated to
contrary actualities. He nowhere gives such an explicit
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account as to why this is also the case for a single passive
potentiality. But one can be reconstructed. Ontologically,
the potentiality to be acted upon is nothing other than the
nature of the substrate of that potentiality, which renders it
susceptible to the action of active potentialities. For
example, any body is such as can be chilled or heated.
Which occurs depends on the active potentiality of that with
which it comes in contact, not on anything internal to the
subject about to be heated or cooled. There is no
metaphysical principle of being heated apart from that of
being cooled. This will also be the case for those passive
potentialities correlative to complex actualities, such as
health and disease.
I suggest that Aristotle' s assertion that the same
potentiality is correlated to contrary actualities holds for
both rational potentialities and passive potentialities. One
may well ask why Aristotle does not come out and say this,
if this is indeed his meaning. Why does he not explicitly
assert that this principle does not hold for the remaining
logical possibility, that of two active potentialities,
correlated to contrary actualities?
I propose that this is because, in the last analysis,
Aristotle does not admit that such a case is metaphysically
possible. Whenever there is a pair of contrary actualities,
there be a real metaphysical principle of causation for only
one of these. For only one actuality is there a real active
potentiality by virtue of which this actuality emerges. The
other actuality is merely what is predicated of the substrate
when this substrate does not stand in the required relation
to such potentiality, or when the active potentiality is in
some way otherwise prevented from doing its work.
For suppose that there is a substrate S for some
passive potentiality for X. Let Y be the contrary to X,
which will be predicated of S to the extent to which X is
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7

absent. We have seen that Aristotle asserts that when the
nonr~tional active potentiality for X stands in the right
re!atwn to th~ passive potentiality for X, the potentialities
will be actualized, and X will be predicated of S. But if
these two potentialities do not stand in the right relation or
so only to a certain extent, the privation of X is inhe;ent
m S. The privation of X, the absence of X in a subject
such as to admit X, will be the contrary of X. So to the
extent. to whic~ the condition of having the potentialities
stand m a certam relation is not met, Y will be inherent in
X. . To return to the example of health, the matter of a
sa~lmg has the potentiality for attaining the final cause of
?emg a t~ee, ~hat is, for being all and doing all that is
m~olved m bemg a mature, flourishing tree. We can call
this goal the healthy life of the tree. (Health is the
permanent state by virtue of which this life 1s led; it in turn
co~es about. t~o~gh the living of a healthy life.) The
active potentiality Is the form of the tree, its soul, already

?o

7

In.Cat. 10 12al-30, 12b27-35, Aristotle distinguishes
contranes that have intermediates from those that do not.
Thus, for .some pairings of contraries X and Y it is possible
for a s~b~ect to be partially X and partially y, and for
others, It IS not. Aristotle presents health and disease as an
example of a pair of contraries with no intermediate but
surely this is a linguistic point, indicating the lack of a ~erm
~o deno.te an intermediate, as "grey" denotes an
mtermediate between white and black. For it is manifest
that one can be healthy to a greater or lesser extent.
Another possibility is that health, considered as an
actualization ?f su~stantial essence, would , in the early
phase of Anstotle s thought to which the Categories
belongs, be an ali-or-nothing predicate.
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ba~ charac~eristics

within the sapling. If the sapling is not given enough water
or light, it will be unable to fully meet this goal. The tree's
active potentiality will be prevented from standing in the
appropriate relation to its passive potentiality. To that
extent it will have predicated of it the contrary of the
"healthy life," that is, it will be living in an unhealthy way.
In such a case there is no need to posit an active
potentiality for the contrary of X. Those agencies that do
seem to be actively responsible for the contrary of X (such
as drought or logging, in the case of the tree) can be
understood as having their causal power because they make
impossible the proper functioning on S of the active
potentialities for X.
It should therefore be no surprise that in the
argument being considered Aristotle omits considering the
possibility of two different potentialities, each directed
toward one of a pair of contrary actualities.

III
Aristotle's assertion in 0 9 that the same potentiality
is in respect to contraries is made to clarify the various
relations that hold among good actualities, bad actualities,
good potentialities, and bad potentialities. Aristotle makes
clear in the Categories that goodness and badness are
examples of contrary attributes for which there are
intermediate attributes between them (Cat. 10 12a13-17, cf.
11 13b36-14a6). It follows that it is the same rational
active potentiality for good and bad results. Again,
Aristotle's example of health and disease sheds light on
this: the art of medicine is a potentiality making possible
both the healing of a patient, presumably a good in some
noncontroversial sense, and the poisoning or infecting of a
patient, likewise something patently bad. Again, the passive
potentialities for goods are likewise potentialities for those
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that are their contraries. For both
ratwn~l ~ctlve and nonrational passive potentialities, the
potentiality as such will be neutral between goodness and
badness. Because the potentiality for the good and for the
bad are one and the same, and both are neutral in respect to
goodn_ess. and badness, Aristotle asserts that the good
~ctuality 1s bett~r than its potentiality, and the bad actuality
1s worse than 1ts potentiality. For, presumably, in some
sense the good actuality is good and the bad actuality is
ba~, but all of the potentialities involved are in themselves
ne1ther good nor bad.
. .
Here, two points need to be made in passing. First,
1t 1~ n?w clear that the good potentiality, which in the
begmrung of our passage is said not to be as good or
~aluable a~ ~he actuality, must be understood as good
msofar_ as 1t 1s a potentiality for some good. Second, the
neutrali~ of the potentiality in respect to goodness or
badness 1s contrasted with the case of actualities because in
that case, _Ar~stotle says, one must be good a~d the other
bad. . !h1s 1s a rather strong claim. Will not many
actualities be neutral in respect to goodness and badness?
We need to return to this point.
Aristotle concludes by inferring that "it is therefore
clear_ that th~re i_s no badness apart from things. For the
b~d 1s postenor m nature to the potentiality." What does
th1s me~, and on what grounds is it argued?
. Fust, what problem is this meant to address? In the
prevwus _ch~pt~r, Aristotle had argued that actuality is prior
~o potenttahty m 'A6yoc,, in time, and in oocria. But if this
1s so, a problem arises in the cases of good actualities that
are co~relative to contrary bad actualities. For, as we have
seen~ m the case of rational potentialities and nonrational
pass1ve p~tentialities, a good actuality and its contrary, a
bad actuahty, share one and the same potentiality. It would
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appear, then, that both the good and .the bad actualities
share the status of priority in A.6yoc,, time, and oucr{a to
the potentiality to which they are both correlated. This
would entail a kind of metaphysical Manicheism, according
to which both good and bad principles are implicit in a
complete account of a potentiality, temporarily precede its
coming-to-be, and are implicitly present as form and final
cause within the being that has this potentiality. With the
possible exception of his account of the hot, the cold, the
wet and the dry, 8 nothing in Aristotle's writings prepares
us for this vision of pairs of competing, equal, and opposite
forms and final causes.
To argue against this possibility, Aristotle presents
as a premise "the bad is posterior in nature to the
potentiality." How is this to be argued for? A~a~n, we
need to consider three different cases. The potentiality for
the badness, which is said to be posterior to this badness,
can either be a rational potentiality, a passive nonrational
potentiality, and/or an active nonration~l potentiali~y.. .
As we have seen, a single ratwnal potentiality 1s
correlative to both a good and a bad actuality because the
rational agent who has a A.6yoc, expressing the cause of
some possible end thereby also has the A.6yoc, of the
privation of the cause of this end, and so is best ab~e to
keep the end unactualized. Here it is clear that the ratwnal
potentiality is prior in A.6yoc,, time, and being to the b~d
actuality correlated to that potentiality. One can explam
how to make one unhealthy only by negating the account of

80n

the other hand, at GC 1.3 318bl7-20 Aristotle
suggests that hot may be a positive attribute and cold a
privation, but the suggestion is made tentatively, for
purposes of illustration.

Aristotle on Good and Bad Actualities

139

how to preserve and produce health; thus the account of
health is prior in A.6yoc, to the account of the ability to
induce disease. Likewise the medical art (which in turn is
posterior to actual health both in time and in essence) must
already exist before it is employed to make patients
unhealthy. Hence we have the temporal priority of the
potentiality, as well as priority in oucr{a, taken either in the
sense of definitional essence or in the sense of reality.
The situation of nonrational potentialities correlated
with good or bad actualities is simpler. Since the good
actuality X and the bad actuality Y are contraries, there will
be the same passive potentiality for each. Y is simply the
absence of X in the subjectS, which is such as to admit of
X.
Y is therefore conceptually and metaphysically
derivative on S, which is defined as that with the
potentiality for X. Likewise, as we have seen, Aristotle
would be led to deny the existence of a separate active
nonrational potentiality for Y. Y, the bad actuality, is
simply what one has when the relevant nonrational passive
potentiality for X, the good actuality, is not actualized. In
the case of active nonrational potentialities, too, the bad
actuality will be metaphysically and conceptually posterior
to the single potentiality involved.
IV
We have seen evidence for attributing to Aristotle
the view that, with possible exceptions at the elemental
level, all contraries are such that one is a positive attribute
and the other the privation of that attribute. The actualized
privation has no contrary with any independent ontological
status. Certain such privations are called "bad" insofar as
they are contrary to other actualities, called "good."
Before exploring the philosophical ramifications of
this view, it would be good examine one more passage in
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which Aristotle seems to be putting forward a similar
teaching. At Physics I 9 Aristotle contrasts his account of
the principles of change with the Platonic account. "The
others" posit only two such principles, on the one hand, "the
Great and the Small," which is the analogue to Aristotle' s
matter, and, on the other, a principle analogous to
Aristotelian form.
They are said to have erred in
maintaining that what is one in number is one in 86va1.w;.
Accordingly, the only principles required for two contraries
X and Y would be the principle of X and the principle of
Y. Of any such pair, the principle of one would be form,
and that of the other would be the Great and the Small.
They overlook the other nature. For there is
that cause which remains and, along with the
form (JlOP~Tl) is responsible for the things
that come to be, in a maternal way. But, to
the one paying attention to the malignant
9
aspect of it (npoc; 'tO KaKonmdv atm1c;),

(Physics 249 .6-11), Philoponus (Physics
186.25-187 .17), Themistius (Physics 32.30-33 .5) , and
W. D. Ross, Aristotle 's Physics: A Revised Text with
Introduction and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press ,
1936), pp . 348 , 497, take KaKo1rot6v to mean "causing
perishing, " referring to the tendency of a privation of form
to lead to the onset of cj>Oop&. But it need not be so
narrowly construed. After all, the passage is conside~ing
the role of privation in the process of coming-into-bemg,
before there is anything that can perish. Accordingly, I
follow Charlton, Aristotle's Physics: Books I and II
(Oxford: Clarendon Press , 1970), pp. 21 , 82, in giving _the
phrase the sense of "evil , " or, more literally , "responsible
9Simplicius
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the other part of the opposition often appears
not to exist at all. For while there is
something divine and good and desired, we
say that on the one hand the contrary to this
exists, and on the other hand, that there
exists that which by nature desires and
craves this, according to its nature. But for
them it turns out that the contrary craves its
perishing. Yet the form cannot desire itself,
since there is no need, nor can the opposite
desire the form, since contraries are
destructive of each other. But that which
desires the form is matter, just as the female
might desire the male, or the ugly might
desire the beautiful. But in this case, the
matter would be female or ugly only
accidentally. (192al2-25)
There is a great deal going on in this famous
passage. Three main questions present themselves. First,
exactly what is the argument against the Platonists, stripped
of metaphorical embellishment and normative talk? Second,
what sense can be given to the apparent identification of all
actualities as good? Third, do the roles played by goodness
and badness in this passage lend support to the
interpretation of good and bad actualities, sketched above?
On Aristotle' s account, the Eleatic argument that
nothing comes from nothing convinced the Platonists that
there needs to be something underlying change, which is
not the same as the end of the change. But insofar as they

for badness," where badness can, as we have seen, simply
be the absence of some actuality considered good.
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hold to the mistaken principle that a single thing can ~~ve
only one potentiality, they were blinded to the recogmtwn
of passive potentialities, and hen~e to the substr~te ~f
passive potentialities, matter. Their OWI_l a~cou~t, Identifying the persistent substrate with the pnvatwn, IS wh~lly
inadequate, for it left unexplai~ed what _metaphysical
principle within this substrate IS responsible for ~he
progression from the privation to the_contrary. No ?emg
has within itself an internal need for Its own destructiOn.
The second and third questions must be approached
jointly. In our passage Aristotle_ again supplements a
consideration of potentiality' actuality' and change, by the
consideration of goodness and badness. Ther~ are two
aspects of this. First, the privation. is consider~d as
responsible for badness, and it is for this reason, ~nstotle
says, that one is tempted to say that it does not e~Ist ~t al_L
Second, the actuality that is the contrary of the pnva~wn IS
considered something good, and on this basis ~Istotle
presents a series of metaphors and examples to clanfy the
relations holding among a substrate, a privation, ~d a form .
Aristotle does not himself take the position that a
privation does not exist at a~l. .It doe_s have a sort ?f
ontological status: it is that which I_s pre~Icated of a certam
substrate in which the positive attnbute_Is ab~ent. It has _a
sort of shadow status. As an absence, It, unhke matter, IS
a non-being in itself (o0K ov Ka8' a0-rf1v: 192a4-5). On
the Other hand Aristotle insists that, unhke that of the
Platonists, "we say that the contrary . . . exists . 't 0 J.lEY
E:vav-riov ~aKEV dvat, 192a17-18). Were this not s?,
Aristotle would not have been taking pains to arg~e ~hat ~f
along with the substrate, must be counted as a pnnciple h
change. It is rather the Platonists who move from t e
. . to Its
· non- beI.ng . What sense
"malignance" of the pnvation
can be made of such an inference?
'

•

II

(
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The answer can be only speculative, since the first
explicit Platonic argument identifying evil and nonbeing
seems to be that of Plotinus (Ennead 2.4), who employs the
Aristotelian conceptual machinery of matter, potentiality,
and actuality to argue for this conclusion. But we can be
reminded that, at least in the metaphysics of the Republic,
it is the form of the Good that is ultimately responsible for
all being. This is, as Santas has shown, 10 the form
responsible for the "ideal attributes" such as intelligibility
and immutability that belong to forms as such. One could
consider it the form of Being, in the strict sense. It would
follow that any being, in the strict sense, would be good,
and hence productive of good. So to the extent to which
something is malignant, it is not!
We might be tempted to read Aristotle as taking all
talk of goodness in a metaphysical context as a kind of
superstitious Platonism. But Aristotle does not argue in this
way. He joins the Platonists in calling the positive term of
change something "divine, good, and desired." His
argument is only that we need to distinguish the bad in
itself, which is merely the absence of the good within a
certain substrate, and perishes when that good comes to be,
from the substrate which, prior to the change, happens to be
bad, but, on account of its own nature (presumably, on
account of its passive potentiality, and, in some cases
perhaps, on account of a natural active potentiality)
becomes good in this process of change.

10

G. Santas, "The Form of the Good in Plato's
Republic, " in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, v. 2,
eds. J. P. Anton and A. Preus (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1983), pp. 232-263.
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From this it is clear that for any change from one
contrary to another, one of these contraries is form and the
other is the contrary of the form. Aristotle calls the for~
good; accordingly the contrary is bad. We now see why, m
the passage from Metaph. e 9 that ~e have be_en
considering, Aristotle says that of every pau of contraries
one is good and the other is bad: the positive attribute or
form is, as such, good.
The text is clear evidence that those actualities that
are bad in a nontheoretical way are privations of certain
"good" actualities. Of any good/bad pair, one m~st_ be the
privation and one must be a positive form. And It IS cle~
that Aristotle accepts without question the general thesis
that badness, when it exists, is caused by some kind of
privation. Aristotle follows the Platonists in rejecting
metaphysical Manicheism.

v
I now turn to some implications the above account
has for our understanding of Aristotelian teleology.
Two major problem areas in the metaphysics of
Aristotle's teleology have surfaced. First, to what extent
does a teleological account commit one to positing_be~~s
other than those posited by a strictly physicalistic
account?' 1 Second, what are the metaphysical implications

There is extensive literature devoted to this question.
Representative arguments for the irreducibility of form (to
which appeal is made within a teleological ac~ount) ca~ be
found in A. Gotthelf, "Aristotle's ConceptiOn of Fmal
Causality" in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biol~gy,
eds. A. Gotthelf and J. Lennox (Cambridge: Cambndge
University Press, 1987), pp. 204-242, and J. Cooper,
11

of the normative element of a teleological explanation? We
explain a feature of a living thing by indicating that it is for
the sake of the good of that being. What is this goodness?
Can it be identified in non-normative language with some
feature of the being in question? Clearly the resolution of
this aspect of Aristotle's meta-biology will have large
implications for the metaphysical foundations of Aristotelian
ethics. For this aspect of Aristotelian teleology will
determine the relation between is-statements and oughtstatements, and accordingly will shed light on exactly how
Aristotle grounds his account of the human good on his
account of human nature.
In regard to this second question, there appear to be
two main alternatives. According to the first, goodness is
a real irreducible attribute of things; a complete account of
something that is good will need to mention its goodness,
in addition to all of its other attributes. On the other
account, the goodness of a being is to be identified with
some other characteristic of that being, which can be
accounted for in non-normative language. Such an account

"Aristotle on Natural Teleology," in Language and Logos,
eds. M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 197-222.
Arguments for some kind of ontological reducibility of
form can be found in M. Nussbaum, Aristotle's De Motu
Animalium: Text with Translation, Commentary, and
Interpretive Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1978), pp. 59-106, and R. Sorabji, Necessity, Cause, and
Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory (London:
Duckworth, 1980), pp. 155-174.
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was suggested by Balme 12 and has been fully argued for
by Gotthelf. 13 According to this account, the good of a
being is simply the actualization of all of its irreducible
potentialities, determined by that being' s form. So if
teleological explanation proceeds by showing how some
attribute or activity is for the sake of an organism' s good,
it in effect shows how this attribute or activity either makes
possible or facilitates the activities in which that organism
can by nature engage.
The two sets of problems are to a certain extent
interrelated. If a complete explanation of the activities and
characteristics can in principle be given by identifying the
underlying material stuffs and their natural characteristics,
both form as such and goodness as such would be
dispensable in explanation, and neither would be present in
an inventory of the basic ontological constituents of that
organism. This is to be expected, since the final cause,
which Aristotle identifies with the good, is also identified
with the form. On the other hand, if the form is not a

12

D. M . Balme, "Teleology and Necessity , " in
Philosophical Issues in Aristotle 's Biology, eds . A . Gotthelf
and J. Lennox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1987), p. 277 .
13

A. Gotthelf, "Aristotle's Conception of Final
Causality , " in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle 's Biology,
eds. A. Gotthelf and J. Lennox (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987), pp . 233-234, and "The Place of
the Good in Aristotle's Natural Teleology," in Proceedings
of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, v. 4,
eds . J. Cleary and D . Shartin (Latham, Md .: University
Press of America, 1989), pp. 113-139.
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being unto itself, but a set of motions of the elements that
are not on account of the natures of those elements, 14 we
could still posit goodness as such as a basic irreducible
characteristic of these motions. Still, whether one posits
form as a per se being or identifies it as a set of motions,
it is possible to deny to goodness any independent
irreducible status. 15

14

This was the final proposal of Balme, in "Teleology
and Necessity," pp. 282-285, and in "Aristotle's Biology
was Not Essentialist," in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle 's
Biology eds. A. Gotthelf and J. Lennox (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press , 1987) pp. 292-293 .
15

Thus the passage from Physics I 9 discussed above
can be read as developing an extended analogy, involving
no attribute of goodness as such to form . Supporting this
reading is the fact that, within his biological and
psychological writings, Aristotle is clear that desire
(opE~u;), in the strict sense, is a faculty possessed only by
animals (DA II 3 414a29-b16) . But there are many
substrates of change that are not animals. So in saying that
something is good we are saying that there is some
substrate which is related to it as is the substrate of desire
towards the object or attribute desired. One version of
such an account would posit goodness as nothing but the
object of desire (cf. NE I 1 1094a1-3). Any ascription of
goodness would thereby be dependent on the speaker's
interests, or desires. Goodness as such would have no
independent ontological status . When we call something
good we are simply saying that we, the speakers, have a
certain potentiality of desire directed towards it, or we are
indulging in a bit of harmless anthropomorphization in
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One objection that has been raised to the Balme/
Gotthelf account of teleology is that Aristotle grants the
existence of both good and bad actualities, and that it is an
essential, and often reiterated condition of an Aristotelian
teleological explanation that it show how some attribute,
organ, or activity of a being contribute to the good of that
being. 16 Accordingly, a teleological explanation does more
than show that something comes about on account of some
"irreducible potentiality."
One of the results of the present paper is that a
careful consideration of those few texts in which Aristotle
does consider the relationships that hold among goodness,
badness, potentiality, and actuality shows that this objection

ascribing such desire to some other substrate.
See J. Cooper, "Aristotle on Natural Teleology," in
Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy
Presented to G. E. L. Owen, eds. M. Schofield and M. C.
Nussbaum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1982), p. 197, and C. Kahn, "The Place of the Prime
Mover in Aristotle's Teleology," in Aristotle on Nature and
Living Things : Philosophical and Historical Studies
Presented to David M. Balme on his Seventieth Birthday
ed. A. Gotthelf (Pittsburgh and Bristol: Mathesis, 1985),
pp. 197-198.
16

Aristotle on Good and Bad Actualities

149

is unfounded. 17 Badness is simply the privation of some
actuality that is good.
The refutation of this objection does not in itself
clinch the case that there is nothing metaphysically involved
in goodness other than actuality as such. There is another
key objection, which I am not able to here address. This is
that Aristotle sets up a hierarchy of actualities, so that some
are of more value or have a greater share of the divine than
others. 18 Is this simply an extension of the metaphor of
the scale of nature, by which some beings have greater
complexity and a quantitatively greater range of actualities
than others? 19 Or is the high regard in which Aristotle
holds those actualities that involve awareness , continuity '
and eternity a sign of an irreducibly normative element
within his ontology? A third possibility, which we cannot
dismiss out of hand, is that Aristotle never gave sustained
attention to this issue, to which we, living in the shadow of
the is/ought distinction, are inevitably drawn.
However we deal with this difficulty, it should be
clear that Aristotle did gives some sustained attention to the

17

In "The Place of the Good, " pp. 116-17, Gotthelf
defends himself against Kahn's criticism by pointing out
imprecisions in Kahn's expression of the objection, but
does not directly address the question of the metaphysical
status of good and bad actualities as such.
18

Relevant passages (such as GA II 3 736b29-33, PA 5
645b22-25 and Metaph. A 7 1032b13-30) are discussed by
Gotthelf in "The Place of the Good," pp. 127-31.
19

This is the suggestion of Gotthelf, "The Place,"
p. 128.
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role of goodness within his teleological account of
substance. In so doing, he showed the basic strategy for
integrating an account of goodness and badness with his
account of actuality and potentiality . .
Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the
Metaphysical Society ofAmerica, at Notre Dame University,
March 13, 1993 and to the Society for Ancient Greek
Philosophy, in Kansas City, May 6, 1994. I thank all of
those who responded to that version in public and in
private. Special thanks are due to David 0 'Connor, for the
probing insights and challenges of his prepared comment
presented at the MSA meeting.
Marquette University
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Hermetica Bibliography

The occasion for this note is the publication of a 42-page
pamphlet:
Elizabeth Ann Ambrose, The Hermetica: An Annotated
Bibliography, #30 in the Sixteenth Century Bibliography
series, published by the Center for Reformation Research,
St. Louis, MO, 1992.
It is a useful publication: Ambrose reviews the history of the

texts (and manuscripts), especially as that history would be seen
from a sixteenth century perspective, and provides one-paragraph
accounts of about twenty-six books, monographs, dissertations, and
articles on Hermetica. It is also rather selective; there is no
attempt to be exhaustive. One crucially important publication that
Ambrose does not discuss (although it is mentioned parenthetically,
p . 32) is:
Garth Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes: A Historical Approach to
the Late Pagan Mind, Cambridge University Press 1986.
For people working in Neoplatonism, this book is an excellent
introduction to Hermetism, since it places the Hermetic texts very
effectively into the milieu of late antiquity. Fowden carefully
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